Fatalism and Foreknowledge
Here, I argued that whether or not to accept the fatalistic argument really boiled down to a choice to how to view future events—as already fixed or not as already fixed. Propositions about future events might be taken as already having truth-values, or they might be taken as taking on truth-values only at the time of occurrence of those future events.
But if we assume the existence of a foreknowing God, that changes. Propositions about future events must then be taken as already having truth-values, which God already knows (although we don’t). The fatalistic argument I gave there, then, must go through:
1. p v ~p (Premiss, by the Law of the Excluded Middle)
2. p—>O(E) (Premiss: If it is true that E occurs at time t, then E has an occurrence-value)
3. ~p—>O(E) (Premiss: If it is true that E fails to occur at time t, then E has an occurrence-value)
4. O(E) (1, 2 ,3, Constructive Dilemma)
This applies to any future event E of which a foreknowing God has knowledge, whether it’s the result of human choice or not. And although one may still argue that God’s foreknowledge is like his looking through a time-telescope, so that he is not bringing about event E (or not-E) but is simply observing it or aware of it, one can no longer argue that event E’s occurrence-value isn’t yet fixed. One can no longer argue that future contingent propositions are neither true nor false.