Foreknowledge and Free Will III
The background for this post appears here and here.
Chad McIntosh (of Doxazo Theos—see links) thinks that the problem with my second argument is that God’s foreknowledge isn’t necessary. He says that I’d be hard-pressed to find a theist who agreed that it was. But I was just reading Alvin Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity, and he argues for just that point—he thinks that in order for a possibly existing entity to count as God, it can’t be omniscient in one possible world but not in another, or omnipotent in one possible world but not in another, or morally perfect in one possible world but not in another. He thinks that God must be maximally great—i.e., maximally excellent in all possible worlds—necessarily maximally excellent. If foreknowledge is part of omniscience, then at least one prominent theist thinks it’s necessary.
Still, I agree that if it’s not necessary, then the second argument, in its short form, fails, since N(Kx) is a premiss of the short form; and I assume that Chad would say that the third premiss of the second argument in its long form, N(Kx) v N(K(~x)), was false, so that it, too, would fail. Denying the necessity of God’s foreknowledge is indeed a way of rendering the arguments unsound.
But I suspect that Chad has in mind not that God isn’t necessarily foreknowing, but rather that his foreknowledge is contingent rather than necessary—that whether God foreknows x or foreknows not-x depends on the agent S’s choice, and is not “written in metaphysical stone” independent of S’s choosing. It is not God’s foreknowing that is contingent; it is what God foreknows that is contingent. And that’s how N(Kx) is false: it’s not N(K(something)) that’s false, but rather N(K(specifically x)) that’s false. Chad might then agree to the truth of N(Kx v ~Kx) but not to N(Kx) v N(K(~x)).
(Chad also notes that God needn’t be foreknowing because there are possible worlds in which, for example, God has not created time; but I am restricting myself to consideration of all possible worlds in which there are human beings making choices. The notion of necessity involved will then be one of relative necessity—necessity relative to a restricted class of possible worlds. Since the class of possible worlds in which there are human beings making choices is exactly the class in which freedom matters, necessity relative to this class seems strong enough to be opposed to freedom.)
I agree with Chad when he writes, “Were S to refrain from x and performed [sic] y instead, God’s foreknowledge would have been different.” I have, in fact, written a defense of that very view here.
What I don’t yet agree with is the necessity of deriving Nx (or Nx v N(~x)). Looking at the first argument I gave:
1. N(Kx—>x) (Premiss—to know that x will occur at t requires that x will occur at t)
2. Kx—>x (1, modal axiom M [or T], i.e., Np—>p)
3. Kx (Premiss—it is known that x occurs at t [since God has complete foreknowledge])
4. x (2, 3, modus ponens)
It seems clear to me that in every possible world in which God foreknows that agent S will choose to perform x at t, agent S will in fact choose to perform x at t, and in every possible world in which God foreknows that agent S will choose to perform not-x at t, agent S will in fact choose to perform not-x at t; agent S’s choice of whether or not to perform x at t is fixed once God’s foreknowledge of which he will perform is fixed. The argument works just as well the other way, of course: Once S’s choice is fixed, so is God’s foreknowledge; and since the relevance of the argument is usually with respect to human freedom of choice, we naturally want to say that as a causal or compulsory matter, that is the way it really works—that God’s foreknowledge is like his looking through a time-telescope and seeing what will happen, rather than like his reaching out and forcing events to occur as they do; and I agree with that; but I do observe that as a strictly logical matter, God’s foreknowledge seems clearly to fix S’s choice. In no possible world can we have both Kx and ~x, and in no possible world can we have both K(~x) and x; what we have, for any possible world in which freedom is a live issue, is N([Kx^x] v [K(~x)^(~x)]). The two—God’s foreknowledge and S’s choice—logically fix each other. This isn’t causation or compulsion, but once you have one, you also have the other. If freedom is supposed to mean that at any time before the choice, the choice is not yet fixed, then this seems to defeat human freedom.
But the real problem with the view that it is S’s temporally later choice of x at time t that causes God’s temporally earlier foreknowledge that S will choose x at t comes about if one tries to combine it with the view that God can interact with the universe in any way whatsoever. If one allows God, who foreknows that agent S will choose to do x at t, to tell agent S beforehand of his future choice, there seems to be a problem: Why can’t agent S, having been informed of his future choice, now decide to behave contrarily and to do not-x at t? Obviously, he can’t so choose, for to do so would violate God’s foreknowledge; but how is he free if he can’t so choose? This argument has force even though Nx would normally be thought of as false. If choice x is the choice to put on a green shirt, we would normally think of it as entirely within S’s power to put on a green shirt and also entirely within his power to put on a blue shirt instead. Even if God foreknows that S will put on a green shirt, it may still be that what God foreknows is really that S will freely choose to put on a green shirt. But if God foreknows S’s choice and also tells S about it, why can’t S choose instead to put on a blue shirt, if he is still free? It seems that the sort of interaction that might lead to S’s choosing differently than foreknown is denied to a foreknowing God, if S is thought to remain free; and it seems that S loses his freedom if a foreknowing God does take part in such an interaction.
Perhaps I need to look around for some characterizations of freedom.
July 4th, 2008 at 5:57 pm
Thanks for replying, Keith.
I’m afraid you’ve misunderstood Plantinga and the traditional way theists have understood omniscience. I agree with Plantinga, as most theists would, that God is necessarily omniscient (essentially omniscient). But from that it does not follow that God has necessary foreknowledge. This is because just what omniscience entails—i.e., foreknowledge, or that foreknowledge is necessary—is entirely debatable. And with respect to that, as I pointed out, “Christian theologians have always insisted that the content of God’s foreknowledge is not necessary. He could have created a world different from this one or no world at all, in which case his foreknowledge would be different. Necessarily, whatever God knows is true, but it is not necessary that God know what he knows” (William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Forenkowledge and Human Freedom [Wipf and Stock, 1999], p. 75). Perhaps the main reason this has been the traditional position is because “[t]o say God’s foreknowledge is necessary is to say that this is the only world he could have created and that he created it necessarily” (Idem), which of course is absurd. So you’re forcing a conclusion I don’t think can be properly drawn from Plantinga.
What’s more is that Plantinga’s position is that even if certain truths are necessarily foreknown by God this still wouldn’t eliminate human freedom. Quite the contrary! Plantinga has shown that “divine foreknowledge threatens human freedom only if God is not essentially omniscient,” where omniscience entails the knowledge of truths necessarily foreknown. See his “On Ockham’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy, 3 (1986), pp. 235-269.
So far as I can see your other arguments and examples still do not eliminate genuine freedom. From the fact that in every possible world God foreknows S’s decision it does not follow that S’s decision was necessary. Or again it does not follow from the fact the God’s telling S that S will do x that S does x necessarily. In both cases the consequence of God’s antecedent knowledge is merely that S will or shall do x, not that S will or shall do x necessarily. Hence, freedom is preserved. Again, just look at your argument—it does not establish Nx.
So long as freedom is to lack necessary antecedent conditions determining actions, you’re yet to show how foreknowledge poses a threat.
July 5th, 2008 at 1:08 am
First, I think I’ve already conceded almost all of what you’re saying. It seems to me that what you want to say is that although God, being necessarily omniscient, necessarily foreknows whatever it is an agent will do–x or, alternatively, not-x–which one he foreknows is no more necessary than the Green Bay Packers’ having won Super Bowl I. The Packers’ win was not a metaphysically necessary event; the Chiefs could have won instead. I know that the Packers won, but my knowing doesn’t make the Packers’ victory metaphysically necessary in and of itself; God foreknows which team will win the next Super Bowl, but his foreknowledge doesn’t make that team’s win metaphysically necessary in and of itself. I grant that.
Second, what *is* necessary is the connection between God’s foreknowing that agent S will choose to do x and S’s subsequently choosing to do x and not not-x. (a) In one sense, this is just like my knowing that the Packers won Super Bowl I: Assuming that I cannot be mistaken about the Packers’ victory (just as God cannot be mistaken about S’s future choice to do x), my knowing is a sufficient condition for the Packers to have actually won Super Bowl I, and yet my knowing doesn’t *make it a fact* that the Packers won Super Bowl I–my knowing doesn’t *bring it about* that the Packers won Super Bowl I. In this sense, God’s foreknowledge that S will do x, while a sufficient condition for S’s subsequent performance of x, needn’t *make it a fact* that S will do x–God’s foreknowledge needn’t *bring it about* that S will do x. This, I think, is at least a large part of the sense of freedom you have in mind: A sufficient condition isn’t the same thing as a determining condition, and God’s foreknowledge that S will do x, while sufficient, isn’t determinative. (b) But in another sense, this necessary connection between God’s foreknowledge that S will do x and S’s doing x is unlike the necessary connection (assuming my infallibility with respect to past events) between my knowledge that the Packers won Super Bowl I and their actually having won Super Bowl I. The dissimilarity consists in this: Nothing I now say or do can induce anyone to do anything to make the Packers fail to win Super Bowl I; but if S is really free with respect to action x, then there are, presumably, things one can now say or do to induce S not to take action x–S’s choice can still be *influenced*. Yet neither connection–the one between my postknowledge of the Packers’ victory and that victory nor the one between God’s foreknowledge of S’s choice to do x and S’s actual performance of x–can be broken. In particular, this means that God cannot do anything to influence S to do not-x, if God foreknows that S will do x. And the simplest way of influencing S to do not-x would be to say to S, “I know you’re going to do x, and there’s nothing you can do about it.” Some agents might want to go ahead and do x anyway, but other agents would want to do not-x, just to be contrary. Yet, if God foreknew that S would do x, the connection between his foreknowledge of S’s doing x and S’s subsequently doing x could not be broken. A contrary agent S, then, would be *unable to do what he wanted to do* at the moment of choice. And being unable to do what one wants to do at the moment of choice seems like a violation of freedom to me!
For this reason, I think you’re demanding too much before acknowledging a limitation on freedom. Nx would violate freedom; but so would N(p–>x) for some true proposition p, since x would then be guaranteed in actual reality despite not being guaranteed in all possible worlds. (Let’s remember that it’s actual reality we’re concerned with!) I’ll try to read the Plantinga article you cite–although it has to come after another one I’m working on comprehending (one on rationality in light of evolutionary theory and naturalism).
July 6th, 2008 at 4:53 pm
Ah, the evolutionary argument against naturalism! I was enthusiastic about this argument when it first appeared in Warrant and Proper Function, but found the critiques of Fitelson and Sober (1998) and those in Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? pretty devastating. I have since found Plantinga’s respective replies sufficient (despite Sosa’s chapter in the recent Alvin Plantinga anthology [Cambridge, 2007], where he more or less just repeats the objections he made in ’02).
Apparently this argument is taken up in Plantinga & Tooley’s Knowledge of God, which is hot off the press. I can’t wait to get my hands on it!
August 21st, 2008 at 10:41 am
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