Foreknowledge and Free Will II
By way of introduction (possibly at too-great length):
Here, I wrote, in part,
“The simple argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge with human freedom of the will, using ‘Np’ to represent ‘metaphysically necessarily p,’ ‘Pp’ to represent ‘metaphysically possibly p,’ ‘x’ to represent ‘x occurs at time t,’ and ‘Kx’ to represent ‘it is known that x occurs at time t,’ is
1. N(Kx—>x) (Premiss—to know that x will occur at t requires that x will occur at t)
2. Kx—>x (1, modal axiom M [or T], i.e., Np—>p)
3. Kx (Premiss—it is known that x occurs at t [since God has complete foreknowledge])
4. x (2, 3, modus ponens)
Hence, if we assume that event x at t is foreknown, we know that event x at t occurs—and, therefore, not event not-x at t. But where is human freedom if what is foreknown dictates what occurs?” I then proceeded to argue that while this argument did not actually imperil human freedom of the will, God’s foreknowledge combined with God’s telling a purportedly free agent what he would do—or, more broadly, God’s initiating any chain of events leading a free agent to choose to do otherwise than God foreknew—would pose a problem: If God says to person S, “You, person S, will choose to do x at t,” why couldn’t S be contrary and choose to do not-x at t instead? If he can’t, where’s his freedom?
Chad McIntosh replied, “The simple solution for the defender of divine foreknowledge to the argument as you outlined it is to point out how, even if sound, the argument doesn’t negate creaturely freedom. This is because the necessity in (1) does not carry over to the conclusion, (4). But carrying necessity to x, at least in the argument as you’ve outlined, would be guilty of an invalid modal operator shift. As it stands, all that follows is x, not Nx. In other words, (4) still allows for possibly ~x, which is entirely consistent with creaturely freedom. What you need is an argument that establishes Nx.”
To which I replied, “It seems to me that although Nx is not established, it is also not needed. In every possible world, we have Kx—>x and K(~x)—>~x, so whether x or ~x is foreknown (in particular, which is foreknown by God) fixes whether it is x or ~x that occurs.
“As long as neither Nx nor N(~x) has been established, one may say, as I suggested, that the foreknower’s knowledge is the result of the agent’s freely choosing x or, alternatively, freely choosing ~x, even though there is no escaping the complete correlation between what is foreknown and what is chosen; one may say that although the agent’s choice is temporally fixed before he makes it, it is ultimately metaphysically fixed by his own choice, which in turn makes the foreknower foreknow what he foreknows. But a problem does arise if the foreknower (in particular, God) tells the agent which choice he is going to make. Why can’t the agent, upon being told which choice he’ll make, simply be contrary and choose the opposite? That’s where the problem arises.”
End of introduction.
While I still agree with what I wrote, it has occurred to me that one can rather easily get the conclusion that Chad McIntosh claims I need, with only slightly different premisses:
1. N(Kx—>x) (Premiss—to know that x will occur at t requires that x will occur at t)
2. N(Kx) (Premiss—it is necessarily foreknown that x will occur at t)
3. Nx (1, 2, modal modus ponens)
(Modal modus ponens states that from N[p—>q] and Np, one can conclude Nq.)
Anyone who thinks that God necessarily foreknows all events, including the outcomes of all human choices, will have to endorse the argument. Of course, we, not knowing whether x or not-x will occur at t, would have to fill in the second premiss as “N(Kx) or N(K(~x)),” but a foreknowing God would know which one he foreknew. If he foreknew not-x, then we’d simply rewrite the argument with “~x” replacing “x.” Anyone not happy with thinking of it that way would instead write
1. N(Kx—>x) (Premiss—to know that x will occur at t requires that x will occur at t)
2. N(K(~x)—> ~x) (Premiss—to know that not-x will occur at t requires that not-x will occur at t)
3. N(Kx) v N(K(~x)) (Premiss—either it is necessarily foreknown that x will occur at t or it is necessarily foreknown that not-x will occur at t (a consequence of God’s necessary foreknowledge))
4. N(Kx)—>Nx (1, Modal Distribution)
5. N(K(~x))—>N(~x) (2, Modal Distribution)
6. Nx v N(~x) (4, 5, 3, Constructive Dilemma)
Whether Nx or N(~x) is the case will, of course, depend on whether God foreknows that x will occur at t or that not-x will occur at t.
Naturally, I, not being a believer in God, do not endorse the claim of God’s necessary foreknowledge; but it seems to me that those who do will have to live with human beings’ lack of metaphysical freedom (even though we may very well choose how to act on the basis of conscious deliberation and of evaluation of possible consequences of our actions).
June 3rd, 2008 at 4:22 pm
The problem with this argument is that
(2) N(Kx)
is false. You’d be hard pressed in finding a theist who holds that God’s foreknowledge is necessary. That God’s foreknowledge is not necessary can be seen by the simple fact that it varies from world to world. In fact, in worlds where God refrains from creating time, for example, he will lack foreknowledge altogether. Or again consider creaturely freedom. From the mere fact that God knows S will do x, nothing necessarily entails S will do x. It just follows that S won’t refrain from doing x, though S possibly could have. Were S to refrain from x and performed y instead, God’s foreknowledge would have been different.
As for a reply to your reply to my reply to your first argument, Nx is very much needed. For most definitions of what it means for an agent to be free is to lack necessary antecedent conditions determining their actions. N is just such a condition. If you are to negate such a definition of freedom, you need an antecedent condition such as N to do it.
June 25th, 2008 at 1:02 am
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