Comments on: Foreknowledge and Free Will http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/ Devoted to Truth Thu, 28 Aug 2008 17:29:29 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5 By: soma http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/#comment-521 soma Wed, 20 Aug 2008 09:56:08 +0000 http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/#comment-521 <strong>soma detox...</strong> essay on soma in a brave new world... soma detox…

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]]> By: Holy Cyclops » Blog Archive » Foreknowledge and Free Will III http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/#comment-111 Holy Cyclops » Blog Archive » Foreknowledge and Free Will III Wed, 25 Jun 2008 05:03:10 +0000 http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/#comment-111 [...] The background for this post appears here and here. [...] […] The background for this post appears here and here. […]

]]> By: Keith Brian Johnson http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/#comment-14 Keith Brian Johnson Wed, 14 May 2008 14:43:02 +0000 http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/#comment-14 It seems to me that although Nx is not established, it is also not needed. In every possible world, we have Kx--->x and K(~x)--->~x, so whether x or ~x is foreknown (in particular, which is foreknown by God) fixes whether it is x or ~x that occurs. As long as neither Nx nor N(~x) has been established, one may say, as I suggested, that the foreknower's knowledge is the result of the agent's freely choosing x or, alternatively, freely choosing ~x, even though there is no escaping the complete correlation between what is foreknown and what is chosen; one may say that although the agent's choice is temporally fixed before he makes it, it is ultimately metaphysically fixed by his own choice, which in turn makes the foreknower foreknow what he foreknows. But a problem does arise if the foreknower (in particular, God) tells the agent which choice he is going to make. Why can't the agent, upon being told which choice he'll make, simply be contrary and choose the opposite? That's where the problem arises. It seems to me that although Nx is not established, it is also not needed. In every possible world, we have Kx—>x and K(~x)—>~x, so whether x or ~x is foreknown (in particular, which is foreknown by God) fixes whether it is x or ~x that occurs.

As long as neither Nx nor N(~x) has been established, one may say, as I suggested, that the foreknower’s knowledge is the result of the agent’s freely choosing x or, alternatively, freely choosing ~x, even though there is no escaping the complete correlation between what is foreknown and what is chosen; one may say that although the agent’s choice is temporally fixed before he makes it, it is ultimately metaphysically fixed by his own choice, which in turn makes the foreknower foreknow what he foreknows. But a problem does arise if the foreknower (in particular, God) tells the agent which choice he is going to make. Why can’t the agent, upon being told which choice he’ll make, simply be contrary and choose the opposite? That’s where the problem arises.

]]> By: Chad McIntosh http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/#comment-12 Chad McIntosh Sun, 11 May 2008 06:20:23 +0000 http://blog.holycyclops.com/2008/05/08/foreknowledge-and-free-will/#comment-12 The simple solution for the defender of divine foreknowledge to the argument as you outlined it is to point out how, even if sound, the argument doesn’t negate creaturely freedom. This is because the necessity in (1) does not carry over to the conclusion, (4). But carrying necessity to x, at least in the argument as you’ve outlined, would be guilty of an invalid modal operator shift. As it stands, all that follows is x, not Nx. In other words, (4) still allows for possibly ~x, which is entirely consistent with creaturely freedom. What you need is an argument that establishes Nx. The simple solution for the defender of divine foreknowledge to the argument as you outlined it is to point out how, even if sound, the argument doesn’t negate creaturely freedom. This is because the necessity in (1) does not carry over to the conclusion, (4). But carrying necessity to x, at least in the argument as you’ve outlined, would be guilty of an invalid modal operator shift. As it stands, all that follows is x, not Nx. In other words, (4) still allows for possibly ~x, which is entirely consistent with creaturely freedom. What you need is an argument that establishes Nx.

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